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ABSTRACT
The missions of the Space Exploration Initiative (SED will support the participation of humans in the
exploration of space beyond Earth-orbit, starting with a Lunar-base and eventually leading to a manned
mission to Mars. These missions pose a new challenge to the designers of machines with which humans
will be required to interact, particularly when those machines have certain attributes that might be
considered intelligent. I speak about this concern and the need for a new philosophy of design from the
perspective of my ctarent position as the Manager of NASA's Project on Human Factors of Space
Exploration.
For the foreseeable future of NASA's program in space, there will be very few activities or missions that
will be accomplished entirely by autonomous systems without human involvement. We will rely on
humans for all critical decisions, and on intelligent utilization of the limited human resource to ensure safe,
reliable, and effective perfcmnance of the space exploration missions. The Mars manned-space_fip entity
must be an integrated man-machine relationship of shared responsibilities in which the psychological
needs, as well as the physical capabilities and limitations, of the hunmn must be considered as fixed
constraints in the total system design. The authority and responsibility for mission success will reside
with the crew, but we will be expected to prove the ability of the total human-machine system to perform
its task.
The concerns that I address in this lecture relative to designs of automated and intelligent systems for the
SEI missions are largely based on the experiences we have had with integrating humans and comparable
systems in aviation. We now have advanced systems and devices onboard our modern aircraft that permit
virtually full automatic fright from shortly after takeoff through landing rollouL with increased precision
and decreased flight crew workload. Generally, these high levels of automation and "glass cockpits" have
been well received by the piloting community. However, several accidents, and a large number of the
reported incidents, have been associated with, and in some cases appear to have been caused by, aircraft
automation, or more properly by the interaction between automation and the human operators of aircraft
We have already learned, for example, that automation is not an easy way to remove human error from the
system. Our experience with automation indicates that its introduction usually relocates and changes the
nature and consequences of human error, rather than removing it. We now know that the new errors
created through automation can, in fact, be worse than the types of errors alleviated through automating,
The evidence of problems of human interactions with advanced cockers has become so pervasive that the
FAA's new National Plan for Aviation Human Factors assigns highest priority to _uraging the
development of "human-centered" design for automation and recommends the development of procedures
for evaluatinghuman factors issuesas partofevery major system development.
For the SEI program, systems that rely on integrated auction and robotics with humans permeate the
arenas of vehicle maneuvering; vehicle servicing in space; in-space and surfa_ assembly and construction;
planetaryrovers;surfaceoperations; extravehicularactivityand exploration;sample acquisition,analysis,
and preservation; and scientific probes and penetrators. We are faced with the problem of designing a
varietyof systems in which a machine and a human willbe exlx_ed to work together as partners,
producing a symbiotic integration of the powers of the human brain and computers. Unfortunately, we
have littleappreciationof eithertlmpotentialor thelimitationsof closeworking relationshipsbetween
humans and intelligent machines, or of how these interactions affect relations with other crew members or
total crew performance. We do not know how to design a non-human intelligence in such a way that it
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will fit natttraUy into a human organization. We do not, at the present time, have a rational, predictive
methodology for system design by which the developer of the artificial intelligence subsystem can integrate
human-factors principles with other system-design principles at an early stage in the development process.
In order to realize the objectives of human exploration of space, we will need to learn how to integrate
humans with machines to an extent far beyond current understandings, and we will need a new philosophy
of design.
Currently, we continue to base designs on concepts that are, in one way or another, largely based on
allocation of functions between man and machines even though this approach has been shown to be
inadequate. The classical situation of human factors has been that some machine has been developed to do
some task, and the human-operator aspects of controlling this machine and of being trained to do so have
been dealt with in due course. The human in between the displays and controls has been used as an
adaptive mapping that relates the interpreted displays into the appropriate control ac'_ions. This concept has
been carded over into the designs of the most advanced automated systems. There has been a tendency to
exploit that which is technologically feasible, leaving to the human pilot those remaining tasks which have
escaped automation, together with whatever new tasks arc generated. This design philosophy will never
enable us to design machines with assurance of safe and reliable human interaction.
In this paper, I discuss a new philosophy for designing automated and intelligent systems based on
thinking of a total system composed of human and non-human entities, whereas current concepts of the
system include only the non-human entities and exclude the human entities. It is the "mutual influences"
among the entities that constitute interactions, and system effectiveness is concerned with optimizing the
interactions, and not the individual behaviors. The design philosophy is based on a concept of building a
human-complementary, human-interactive system. In this philosophy, the allocation of tasks between
men and machines becomes a meaningless concept. We are forced to think about a task that can be done
by men and machines working together in a parmership. I describe how this design philosophy relates to
an understanding of coordinated human activity, like that of the flight crew of commercial transport that
has been the subject of studies at NASA-Ames for many years. Just as in a team of human performers,
proficiency of the individual entities is no assurance of proficient and effective team or system
performance.
Another concern that I address is that, in the current design philosophy, human-machine interaction is
considered to be merely one of interface design. This viewpoint is superficial and a dangerous
oversimplification. Artificial intelligence is going to be used to support dynamic interactive tasks in which
the human mind is an important and active component of the total system. Designing tools for this kind of
interaction is a cognitive activity. One cannot simply build a stand-alone intelligent system and then
decorate it with human-computer interface features, and expect to achieve meaningful cooperation between
the human and the machine. Certainly, interface design is an important element of the integrated human-
system design, but the interactions must be well understood before undertaking an interface design.
In my design philosophy, computers and humans can both be viewed as inform___non-processing systems
capable of independent intelligent behavior. Consequently, understanding human.computer interaction
necessarily involves understanding the individual processes of cognition of both parties as well as the even
more complex processes resulting from attempts at their coordination and interaction. Our current research
on computational modelling of human perception and cognition will enable us to _be the
complementary contributions of human and machine to a system in order to be able to address human
factors issues during the conceptual design stages of missions and systems. Using these models, we have
already been able to develop protocols for enhanced and reliable human performance of tasks through
proper selection of stimulus and response modalities that avoid cognitive conflict. The agent architecture
of our computational models enables us to begin to consider intermixes of human and non-human
intelligence. With their continued development and validation, we will use these computational models in
simulations to develop guidelines for designs of missions, operations, and procedures, as well as
intelligent systems.
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I, INTRODUCTION
A manned voyage to Mars is no longer a fantasy of authors of science-fiction. Almost
certainly, the human who will first set foot on the surface of Mars is alive today. It is the
inevitable next giant step for mankind.
In a speech commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the first lunar landing, President
Bush announced a long-term continuing commitment to the human exploration of the Moon
and Mars. The implementation of this Presidential commitment is NASA's program called
the Space Exploration Initiative or SEI. The SEI will support the participation of humans
in the exploration of space beyond Earth-orbit, starting with a Lunar-base and eventually
leading to a manned mission to Mars.
A manned voyage to Mars means living and working in space for well over a year, isolated
from Earth without any hope of help in an emergency. Within a week after launch from
low-Earth orbit, the Earth will appear to the voyagers to Mars to be smaller than does the
Moon seen from Earth. A couple of months out, the Earth will be a tiny black spot as it
passes across the disc of the Sun. Communications with Earth will be very inconvenient
with transmission delays of several minutes. The detachment, the severance of Earth ties,
will seem quite complete to our Mars spacecrew. For some crew members, life in the
confinement and isolation of the Mars spaceship may be characterized by fatigue,
moodiness, disturbed sleep, sensory deprivation, lack of tnivacy, monotony, and
loneliness as well as the constant possibility of life-threatening dangers or crisis situations.
Cooped up in tiny, noisy quarters with others from whom there is no escape, the irritation
with each defect in the setting increase_ with the time it must be endured. Analogous
experiences of submarine crews on long-duration submerged patrols, Antarctic-based
personnel, participants in underwater habitat experiments, and the US and Soviet manned
space experiments have all shown effects of high emotional stress in the forms of apathy,
depression, insomnia, hostility, boredom, and a consistent decline of motivation. Intense
fear produces a temporary loss of perceptual acuity and perceptual-motor coordination, a
narrowing of attention span and range of perceived alternatives, reduction in problem-
solving and decision-making capabilities, oversight of long-term consequences, and
inefficiency in information search. Effects such as these on any single member of a group
will influence group functioning. It may be fair to question whether a human crew can
survive such a journey, much less remain productive. Nevertheless, our Mars voyagers
must arrive at their destination in good physical and mental condition ready to go to work in
the 1/3 gravity of Mars after 8 months of weightlessness -- without any hope of assistance
from the local inhabitants. (Ref 1)
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There are a great many questions to be answered about the physiological, psychological
and behavioral effects of such a mission on the human crew before w_ will be able to
ensure their safety, reliability, and productivity. In this lecture, I propose to address only
one small, but very significant, part of this scenario. I am concerned about the design of
the systems with which the crew will need to interact in order to perform these
extraordinary missions. I am concerned because, as the Manager of NASA's Project on
Human Factors of Space Exploration, I have assumed a certain personal responsibility for
the crew s safety and productivity. The purpose of this paper is to tell you of my personal
perceptions of some of the issues confronting the designers of the machines with which
humans will be required to interact, particularly when those machines have certain attributes
that might be considered as "intelligent". As I do not accept the connotation of intelligence
when applied to machines, I prefer to speak, for the most part in this presentation, of
various degrees of automation, rather than intelligent systems. All automation might be
viewed as exhibiting some aspect of intelligence, but artificial or machine "intelligence" is
quite different from human intelligence, and it serves no useful purpose to try to relate one
to the other.
The Mars spacecraft will be a living entity adapted for survival in space independent of
Earth; a symbiosis of humans and machines functioning autonomously. There will be
very few activities that will be accomplished entirely by autonomous systems without
human involvement. The Mars manned-spaceship entity must be an integrated man-
machine relationship of shared responsibilities. The authority and responsibility for
mission success will reside with the crew, but we will be expected to prove the ability of
the total human-machine system to perform its task.
My concerns about the designs of automated systems for the SEI missions are largely
based on the experience we have had with integrating humans and comparable systems in
aviation. The demands of the aviation system have motivated much of the automation we
now take for granted. (Ref 14) I do not intend to appear critical of the enormously capable
aircraft flying safely today; however, just as other fields traditionally look to aviation for
technological leadership, Human Factors researchers can learn much that is relevant to
design of space systems by examining the history, the developments, and the problems of
modern cockpit design and operational aviation experience.
II. YESTERDAY
The history of human factors in machine design has been that a system is developed to
perform some mission or task, and the human-operator aspects of controlling this machine
and of being trained to do so have been dealt with in due cota'se. For the first few decades
of aviation this approach worked fairly well for aircraft design, because we could rely on
the adaptability of the human. We could take advantage of each new technology as long as
the human perceptual capabilities were sufficient to provide all the information he needed to
operate the system reliably. Things started to change dramatically in our military fighter
aircraft during the late '40's and early '50's. These aircraft were assigned a greater variety
of missions each of which had become increasingly more complex. Automated devices
were required to make flying the higher-speed aircraft easier, but these required more
displays to enable the pilot to monitor their performance. More and more information had
to be presented to the pilot to enable him to make the decisions and to operate the systems
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necessary to accomplish all these missions. The reliance on instntmental information
increased while, at the same time, the number of insu'uments in_ Over the next few
decades, electro-mechanical instruments, switches, and buttons propagated wildly in the
cockpit, filling all the available space. Unfortunately, the aircraft also became slimmer and
the space available in the cockpit for displays diminished. Fortuitously, the technology for
computer-genera_ displays and computer-mediated controls became available in
reasonable sizes, power requirements, and cost. The cockpit designer's solution to his
dilemma was to replace the rusk-specific displays and controls with multi-purpose displays
and mulrl-function controls. This solved the narrowly defined display problem, but the
computers that were brought aboard to drive these displays were capable of presenting far
more data than a human could possibly access and assimilate in real timemand designers
began to make full use of that capability. The cockpit of the F- 18 aircraft is one of my
favorite examples of the dam overload produced by the display designers of that era.
The F- 18 cockpithas threecathode-my tubesand a head-up display.The_ are 675
acronyms and 177 symbols thatcan appe_ infourdifferentsizeson any of the three
cathode-my tubes.There arc 73 threat,warning, and cautionindicators,59 indicator
lights,and 6 warning tones (no messages, justtones),10 multi-functionswitches on the
throttle,7 on the stick,19 conn-olson thepanel underneath theheaul-updisplay,and 20
controlsaround theperipheryof each of thethreecathode-my tubes,each of which has a
multi-switchcapability.Most of thedatadisplayedrexlttiresthatthepilot'sfovealvisionbe
engaged (whileperipheralvision,a valuablecommunication channel inearlierdisplays,is
largelyignored).Every piece ofdatathatisavailabletothepilotthrough the multi-purpose
displays requires an additional control to access it. This requires the pilot to remember how
to access the desired data and how to perform the necessary sequence of control functions.
Often, these controls must be found and acnmmd by touch while the pilot is visually
engaged elsewhere, sometimes during moments of extreme physical and mental stress.
Concomitantly, as not all of the information about his _ could be displayed to the pilot
at all times, there evolved a proliferation of warning and alerting systems. These systems
reminded the pilot to take actions, call at_ntion to deviations fi'om expected ranges, suggest
or demand an action, warn of unacceptable configurations, and even rake action on their
own. Voice and other aural displays and even tactile displays were introduced in an atmmpt
to increase the number of physical channels available for transferring atl these dam.
However, we learned that the addition of a secondary modality does not double the
human's information processing capability; indeed it may even impede it by diswacting the
operatorata criticaltime. Infact,theoperatormay not even be aware of additional
informationregardlessof themodality because humans, under high-samssconditions,tend
tonarrow theirattention.To make mattersworse,the human tendency in stressful
situationsisto see what he expectstosee and hear what he expects tohear.
The problem was furtherexacerbatedby a traditionaldevelopment processinwhich the
aircraftflightcontrolsand the cockpitdisplayswere designed in separatedepartments that
seldom communicated with one another.The human inbetween the displaysand controls
was used as an adaptivemapping thatrelatedthe interpretedisplays into the appropriate
controlacdons. While thedisplaydesignerswere concerned with thingslikeambient
lighting,viewing angle,luminance, contrastratio,fontsize,color,resolution,wave length,
and findingspace inthe crowded cockpit,the flight-controlengineerswere separately
interpretingthetestpilot'sCooper-Harper ratingsintoterms of aircraftdesign parameters to
establishrccluiremcntsforautomation and augmentation ofitsstabilityor control
characteristics.
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Neitherwas paying much atmntion totheinformationalneeds or theperceptualand
cognitivelimitationsof thepilot.Consequently,problems atthe human-machine-sysmms
levelwere discoveredonly duringOlacrationor,atbest,during flighttestor man-in-the-
loop,ground-based simulationlateinthe system development.
We found that the electronic display systems we provided to aid the pilot someKmcs were
not helping at all, and were actually complicating his job. The pilot was frequently being
confronted with too much data in formats that were not conducive to rapid interpretation
and integration, and whose access imposed a memory load. Some applications of
computer interface technology resulted in increased demands on the slow, deliberative,
capacity-limited human cognitive processes rather than in engaging parallel, automatic,
perceptual-recognition-based processes. The pilot was often drowning in data much of
which may be essential to his survival, but was starved for information. Unfortunately,
most of these technological advancements in automation and displays, and their
concomitant problems, were not confined to the cockpits of military aircraft; they also
appeared on the flight decks of commercial air transports, in submarines, nuclear power
plant control rooms, battle command and control centers, space launch and mission control
centers, and, even, in surgical operating rooms.
It may still come as a shock to some designers (although it should not surprise this
audience) to learn that the human-machine performance, and the Cooper-Harper ratings,
can be influenced by changes in the designs of either the displays m"the controls. (Ref 2,3)
Lcbacqz and Aikcn showed thatthereexistsa tradeoffbetween controlaugmentation
complexity and displaypresentationsophistication,and thatthetradeoffisa functionof the
taskbeing performed. Furthermore, (withalldue credittomy good friendsGeorge
Cooper and Bob Harper forthe admirableoriginalintentof theirratingsystem) pilot
opinion expressed asCooper-Harper ratingscannot be used todesign systems because the
pilotcannot,and should not be expected to,identifythe particularfeatureof thedisplay-
controlsystem towhich he isreacting.From thepointof view of the human in between,
the issuesof displaysand controlsare not separable.
In 1920, the Air Service News Letter No. V1394 on "General Rules to be Observed at all
U.S. Flying Fields" said "do not trust any altitude instrument". We have come a long way
toan era when on-board computers automaticallyexecute preciseverticalnavigation
maneuvers. Today, computer technology has made possiblelevelsof automation which
existedonly insciencefictiona shorttime ago. The modem aircraftisheavilyautomated
and multiplecolorcomputer screensinthe "glasscockpit"on themodern flightdeck show
maps, instrumentreadings,and even procedures.
Before going further, let me clarify a current confusion. The term "glass cockpits" is often
used interchangeably with automation when, in fact, they are not synonymous. The
widespread use of cathode ray tubes (CRT) on modern flight decks to replace the array of
electro-mechanical gages and dials has led to the use of the term "glass cockpit". However,
conventional instruments have been converted to computerized displays on CRTs without
necessarilyintroducingany changes in thedegree of automation. Also, autopilotsof one
sortor anotherhave been introducedintoaircraftwithoutany significantchanges inthe
displays.In fact,the firstconcepts forautopilotcontrolwere proposed beforethe Wright
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brothers flew. In 1891, Hiram Maxim patented a gyroscopic "stability augmentation"
device that was meant to adjust the flight surfaces of a flying machine.
The Flight Management System (FMS) which first made its appearance about ten years
ago, incorporates an entire flight plan and replaces the reams of navigational charts that arc
needed to cross the continental US (although the paper charts are still carried on board in
case of computer failure). Advanced systems and devices on board our modern aircraft
now permit virtually full automatic flight from shortly arm" takeoff through landing rollout,
with increased precision and decreased flight crew workload. Moreover, these high levels
of automation and "glass cockpits" have been ',veil received by the piloting community.
Results of a survey of over 1400 pilots and engineers conducted recently by the RAF
Institute of Aviation Medicine revealed enthusiasm for the advanced automated flight decks.
(Ref 4) The pilots generally said they liked flying them, they were less tiring, and they
were "controlling" and not merely "monitoring" or "managing" the automated system.
However, we have not yet accumulated sufficient experience to praise or condemn with
assurance. These new aircraft are designed to work best "hands off" during nominal
operations, and they are excellent in this mode. It is only when the pilot must take over in
-IZff:RQIRLI_situations that human factors issuesevercome to fight;but,thesesystems are
designed tovery high standardsof reliability.Off-nominal situationsdue to system failures
arerare,and most of thepilotswho responded to thequestionnairenever encountered one.
Nevertheless,a number of incidentshave alreadybeen reportedthatgive us cause totake
anotherlook atthehuman-machine interactionsof thesemodem aimmft. (Ref 5) The
sourceof much of our informationisNASA's and the FAA's confidentialAviation Safety
Reporting System conceived over 15 yearsago by my collcagneatAmes, Dr. Charles
Billings.CRef 6)
We have learned from these reports that the introduction of automation has had
unanticipated effects on human performance and has introduced new kinds of system
faults. We have found that automation usually relocates and changes the nature and
consequences of human error, rather than removing it. Despite the aerospace industry's
success at developing ever more sophisticated and reliable technology, the percentage of
human-crror-rehted incidents and accidents has remained remarkably constant. (Rcf 7)
Recent figures from the FAA attributed 66% of air-can'icr accidents, 79% of commuter fatal
accidents, and 88% of general aviation fatal accidents to human error as a causal factor.
However, it is only fair to point out that the human who erred was not always one of those
on the flight deck; be may have been on the ground at the time or back at his plant where
he designed the aizcrafL
Several accidents,and a largenumber of reportedincidents,have been associat_ with,and
in some casesappear tohave been caused by theinteractionbetweon automation and the
human operatorsof aircraft.Flightcrews have ignored (orhave been unaware of)
important insmm_nt readings such as fuellevels,have failedtohear warning devices,have
deviatedfrom basicoperationalprocedures,have shutdown the wrong engine or thrown
the wrong switch,have failedtocoordinatecrew activities,have apparentlybecome totally
disoriented,and have continuedtorelyon theautopflotwhen itclearlywas not operating
properly. Automation has actedin ways not expected or desiredby the pilots.In sonm
cases,automated configurationwanting deviceshave failedor been mndeatd inolxa'ative
and flight crew procedures have failed to detect, by independent means, an unsafe
configuration.Inothercases,automation has operatedin accordance with itsdesign
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specifications, but in a mode incompatible with safe flight under particular circumstances.
In still others, automation has not warned, or flight crews have not detected, that the
automation was operating beyond its design limits or unreliably.
We have also received reports of incidents from commercial aviation that have been
identified with too little workload in some phases of flight to the point of complacency, lack
of vigilance, and boredom Others have been associated with too much workload in off-
nominal situations, particularly when the automated systems call for increased head-down
operations during these times.
The computers introduced between the aircraft's state sensors and the displays and between
the pilot's inputs and the highly automated control surfaces of the aircraft serve to obscure
the pilot's image of his aircraft. Previously, displays and controls were both directly
coupled to the ain.'mft so that the pilot was able to construct the mental image of the aircraft
state directly from displayed responses to his control inputs. Today, engineers can easily
and inexpensively incorporate logic into the airplane itself; but the computers introduce Coy
design or other, vise) dynamic mappings of their own so that the pilot is no longer able to
relate the displays directly to the aircraft state or his control inputs to the airt:mft's
responses. The displayed data are not consistently related to the pilot's inputs. (Ref 8)
Arbitrary delays, spatial separation of cause and effect, and dictate, discontinuous
subsystems tend to obscure cause-effect relationships. The pilot is insulated from the
aircraft and develops a completely different image of the system he is operating than he
would if the computers were not them. Consequently, any failure of the computers (either
due to electro-mechanical failure or an unexpected situation) requires the pilot to intervene
in a system with which he is not currently familiar.
Intervention is fu_er complicated by inadequate feedback to the operator about system
status for timely diagnosis should an off-nominal situation occur. (Ref 9) Consider, for
instance, the case of the race car that was equipped with the latest automatic compensation
for brake failures. When it suffered a failure in one bralm, the system automatically
compensated, just as it was designed to do. Shortly after, a second brake failed, and, due
to the increased loading caused by the compensation system, the third-_ failure quickly
followed the second. But, the automatic compensation system had done its job so well that
it was not until the fourth brake failed that the driver realized he had a problem. This might
make a humorous anecdote except for what happened to the driver and the fact that them am
several examples of similar incidents occurring in aviation. Consider the case of the China
Airlines 747 accident in 1985 which experienced a gradual loss of power from its outer
right engine. The autopilot compensated for the increasing tendency to yaw until it finally
reached the limit of its compensatory abilities and could no longer keep the plane stable. At
this point, the crew did not have enough time to determine the cause of the problem and to
take action. More recently, a failed fuel pump on an A320 caused a gradually increasing
unbalance that was quietly and efficiently compensated by the autopilot with no indication
of a problem to the crew.
Recently, aircraft designers have begun to look at incorporating mo_ and mote
"intelligence" into the automated systems as ways of augn_nting (or replacing) human
capabilities and, thereby, reducing the potential for human error. Artificial intelligence,,
decision-aiding systems, knowledge-based systems, and expert systems became the "buzz
words" of the eighties. Today, we arc considering proposals for military aircraft with one
human pilot supported by several electronic crew members. I recommend a considerable
dose of caution. While knowledge-based and expert systems have found some limited
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appLications in the control of physical plants, manufacturing processes, and quality control,
the majority of these systems have fallen short of the promise of competent performance.
(Ref 10) While these systems can take over control that used to be done by people, they
are not able to handle all abnormalities, nor are they able to provide the continual,
appropriate communication with a human partner that occurs naturally among human team
members.
A large part of the problem is that technicaliy complex and sophisticated systems continue
to be designed assuming the human opcmu_ will provide all the adaptive control and
integration required for effective operation. The systematic camsiderafion of human
cognitive performance characteristics and limitations is not typically a part of the design of
the aircrew statio_ There is little evidence that anyone has analyzed the role of the modem
flight crew and designed the cockpit, the insmmaentations, the procedures, and the controls
around that role. The aerospace community stR! treats human errur as a training or
discipline problem, not as a sign of poor design or inappropriate procedures. (Ref 11)
Bainbridge says" the designer who tries to eliminate the ¢veramr still leaves the operator to
do the tasks which the designer cannot think how to automate". (Ref 12) The tendency to
exploit that which is technologically feasible, leaves to the human pilot not only those tasks
which have escaped automation, but also whatever new tasks are generated as a
consequence of automation. Frequently, such systems only work in the most benign
environments. Wiener has called such designs "clumsy" automation, but they are clumsy
because they have not taken proper account of the characteristics of the human operator.
(Ref 13)
We have learned that the new errors created through the current philosophy of design of
automation can, in fact, be worse than the types of errors alleviated through automating.
Egan found that there are dramatically greater individual differeuces in the performance of
computer-mediated tasks, and suggests that most of the difference is due to a larger number
of more costly errors inherent in computer tasks. (Ref 14)
While automation conveys very significant benefits, the aviation community clearly
perceives in automation a potential threat to air safety. (Ref 15) Questions are beginning to
emerge about the respective roles of humans and the new technology. Anecdotal reports of
problems with automated systems are abundant, and mostly these have not been the results
of failure in machine reliability, but rather of failure of information management and
communication between the machine and the human operator.
The evidence of problems of human interactions with advanced cockpits has become so
pervasive that the new US National Plan for Aviation Human Factors assigns highest
priority to encouraging the development of "human-centered" design for sntorrmtlon and
recommends the development of procedures for evaluating human factors issues early in
the development of every major system. Also, the human factors problem has been
recognized as curang across all elements of the aviation system where the system
encompasses the flight deck, the training, the operating procedures, the air traffic control
system, the maintenance environment, the system designers, and the systems integration.
(Ref 16)
A lack of understanding of and appreciation for the characteristics, needs, and limitations of
human performance and behavior manifests itself today as mistakes in the designs of flight
deck displays and controls, unrealistic Im3cedur_, excessive training costs, and a challenge
to human adaptability. (Ref 17) The capability to model, _, and analyze the human
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components of complex and interactive man-machine systems, has not kept pace with the
current capability to _velop advanced technology systems with which the human must
interact. For certain,our experienceswith automation inaviationgiveus cause to question
whether thecurrentdesignphilosophy based on allocationof functionsand relianceon
human adaptabilitywillsufficefor designingthesystems of the SEI missions.
IV. TOMORROW
All of the missions of theSEI willbe performed by a composition of integratedtechnical,
human-biological,and human-social subsystems. The operationalenvelope of these
missions willbe determined not only by theindividualcapabilitiesof each of thesevarious
subsystems, but also by their combined performance as a result of human interactions with
otherhumans, with hisenvironment, with the machines and equipments, and with the
operationalprocedtues.
For the SEI program, systems that will rely on integrating automated and robotic machines
with humans permeate the arenas of vehicle maneuverinff, vehicle servicing in space; in-
space and surface assembly and construction; planetary rovea's; extravehicular activity and
exploration; sample acquisition, analysis, and preservation; and scientific probes and
penetrators. Humans will need to interact reliably, safely, and efficiently with complex,
automated machines during inspection, assembly, check-out, operation, maintenance,
repair, and emergency intervention in order to perform the tasks of the exploration
missions. The SEI missions will rely on intense interdependencies among humans and
machines to an extent that is seldom encountered on Earth. To achieve the objectives of the
Mission from Planet Earth, we are faced with the problem of designing a variety of systems
in which machines and humans will be expected to work together as partners, Froducing a
symbiotic integration of the powers of the human brain and computers. This is an
incredibly complex and difficult challenge. It is quite likely that successful developments in
these areas will pace the progression of the SEI missions from the Moon to Mars.
The Committee on Human Exploration of Space ofthe NationalResearch Council,inits
review of NASA's Report of the90-day Study on Human Explorationof the Moon and
Mars (November 1989),identified"ExplorationHuman Factors"as "CriticalExploration
InitiativeTechnology". The "Review of NASA's 90-Day Study and Alternatives"
publishedby the NationalAcademy Press (1990)statesthat:
"Mechanical and computer-aided extensions of human (astronaut) managers can provide
enhanced efficiency in inspection, assembly, maintenance, repair, and exploration tasks.
The most powerful approaches to human exploration will integrate humans with machine
systems to accomplish more than either can do alone.
".. Advanced human machine systems are not merely an enablin_ technolovv, but a
requirement for practical HEI ooerations. Technical advances can extend piofoundly the
human role as master of higMy flexible human surrogates, but obtaining such potential
benefits will require more than complex robotry and automation. NASA presentations
based on the 90-Day Study implicitly recognize this by grouping operations in functional
categories. Systems that integrate automation and robotics with humans permeate the arenas
of vehicle maneuvering; vehicle servicing in space; in-space and surface assembly and
-15-
construction; planetary rovers; surface operations; extravehicular activity and e:rploration;
sample acquisition, analysis, and preservation; and scientific probes and penetrators."
The recent Report of the Advisory Committ_ on the Futur_ of the U.S. Space Program
(the Augustine Commit_ retxm) also addressed these centers. (Ref 18) While it does
not specificallyspeak ofHuman Factors,thereare stamments regardingLife Sciences in
most ofthe programmatic recommendations thatclearlyimply concerns forthe behavioral
and psychological,as well as thephysiological,well being ofthe astronauts.The reportof
theSynthesisGroup titled"America attheThreshold" specificaUyrccognims thecriticality
of Human Factors,and theneed todesignequipments and machines forcompatibiltywith
human operators.(Rcf 19)
So far, our approach to designing automated systems with which humans must interact has
not bccn entirelysatisfactory.Currently,the functionalrequirementsfor complex systems
rarelyspecifyeven the information needed by the human operatortoperform therusk. (Ref
20) We shallbe unable toimplement rationaldesignsforthe systems we need to
accomplish the SEI missions with assuranc,of safeand reliablehuman-system
performance without an understandingof how tocombine human and automated systems
effectively.
Designs foreffectivehuman-computer inmractionsarc furthercomplicatedby the effectsof
long-durationmissions in space. We do not yet know the effectson crew performance of
long-termisolationand confinement,orof long-termexposure to _ gravity
or toartificialgravity.Wc do know thatlong periodsof low-levelinteractioncan resultin
dccre_ed system productivitydue tomonotony and boredom of the human operator.We
do not know how tokccp crew members highlyskilledatcomplex tasksthatthey seldom,
if ever,have to perform. The impact of automation on crew pm'formauce in terms of
vigilance,readiness,and the abilitytohandle system breakdowns and failuresare not well
understood. The most importantfunctionsaboard presentday and projectedspacecraft
involvediagnosisand decisionmaking, and our greatestgap inknowledge currentlyin task
retentionisinunderstandingtheretentionof diagnosticand dezfision-making_ll_. All of
thesefactorsmust be taken intoaccount indesigningthe systems with which theSEI-
mission c'mws willinteract.(Ref21)
Also, thehuman-machine systems forthe SEI missions must be designed according toa
philosophy of human-centered automation because the effectiveauthorityand reslxmsibility
formission successwillrestwith thecrew. For theforeseeablefuture,itisunlilmlythat
NASA would toleratethefieldingof a system thatiscapableof effectivelyoverrulinga crew
m_mbcr. Moreover, the human crew willdemand thatfinalauthority.Automated systems
will provide suPlx)rt for the crew's I:mrformance of critical tasks and must be designed to
enable maximum flexibility in the crew's selection between cotnplem automation and
complete manual controlinthe performance of a given task,and so the problem areaisthatof
partialautomation.
Unfortunately,we have littleappreciationof eitherthe potentialor the limitationsof close-
working relationshipsbetween humans and complex, automated machines, or of how these
interactionsaffectrelationswith othercrew members or totalcrew perfornmn_. We do not
know how todesigna complex, automated machine insuch a way thatitwillfitnaturally
intoa human organization.(Ref 17) We do not,atthepresenttime,have a rational,
predictivemethodology forsystem designby which thedeveloperof the artificial
intelligencesubsystem can integrate human-factors principleswith other system-design
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principles at an early stage in the development process. The basic research has barely
begun to explore even those human factors issues that have been evidenced in our aviation
experiences. I am concerned that, without the appropriate design philosophy, the
introduction of artificial intelligence subsystems can exar.erbate the already extraordinary
operational problems of the SEI missions.
V. A DESIGN PHILOSOPHY:
In 1947, Fitts and Jones stated; "It should be possible to elirm'nate a large portion of so-
called "pilot error" accidents by designing equipment in accordance with human
requirements". (Ref 22) In 1951, Fitts, in a landmark paper, developed a list comparing
the functions for which man is superior to machines to the functions for which the machine
is superior to man. (Ref 23) Ever since that time, this list has been used for assigning
duties and allocating functions between man and machines in designs of automated
systems, but it does not work. While strides have been made in reducing the probability of
some kinds of pilot error, the design philosophy based on allocation of functions between
men and machines has not been successful in coping with the increasing complexity of
modern aviation systems. All attempts to build and expand upon this concept have led to
difficulties and contradictions. The facts of the Fitts list are correct and, yet, the concept
has failed to produce reliable systems. The inutility of Htts' list must be associated with its
use as a basis for comparing man to machine and choosing the one that fits best to a
required function. The problem is that men and machines are not comparable, they are
complementary. (Ref 24)
We need a new philosophy for designing systems that are composed of human and
complex, automated entities working together to accomplish a task. This philosophy must
not try to compare men with machines in the competition for assignment of duties that the
concept of allocation of functions has produced. Rather it must be based on ways to allow
men and machines to complement each other. It must take into account man's perceptual
and cognitive capabilities and limitations, rather than rely on his adaptability. I propose to
construct a rationale for such a philosophy on the basis of my perceptions of the
circumstances that will prevail in the development of the systems needed for the SEI
missions.
Billings (Ref 15) views the relationship of human involvement and automation in aircraft as
a continuum ranging from 'q)irect Manual Control" to "Autonomous Operation". I prefer
to view the systems for the SEI missions as falling into one of the following three distinct
categories:
CASE 1: A subsystem may be designed to operate automatically when
a. all the feana'es of the state of the world necessary and sufficient for all
decisions to be made can be sensed, processed, and controlled with
adequate accuracy by the machine alone; and
b. the automatic system can be built with acceptable operational reliability
(includingin unpredictablesituations).
When the task environment is predictable and a priori controllable, and when the activities
necessary for the task are iterative and demand consistent performance, a machine can, and
should, perform the task without continuous human involvement. The nominal operation
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of such subsystems can be made transparent to the human. These systems are nearly
completely automatic, except that they must be designed to allow graceful intervention by
the human operator in the rare emcrgendes, and for maintcnanc . Subsystems that fall into
this category, for example, arc the automated yaw damper on aircraft, the automatic choke
in the automobile, and, very likely, the life-support systems for the planetary habitats.
These arc what Dave Woods ¢t al call "imelligentsubord,'na_". (Ref25) An important
area for human factors engineering research that has been neglected is how to design a
complex automatic system to facilitate its being backed up manually.
CASE 2: Humans will not require or rely on computm'-based systems for assistance in
making decisions when
a. human sensors (or direct access to human-compatible sensors) of all
features of the state of the world necessary and sufficient for all decisions to
be made am adequatnly accurate; and
b. there is adequate time for the human to make the decisions and take the
actions with acceptable reliability.
When the environment is not predictable, or, ff predictable, not conu'ollable a priori, then
man (aided by the tm_er tools) is required. A subsystem that fails into this category
produces, at most, an interface design problem to put maehim-sensed dam into human-
compatible displays. The personal computer and the automobile steering system fail into
this category.
In practice, for the sake of safety and reliability, many subsystems will be designed to fall
within one or the other of these first two categories. However, for space missions, these
will not be sufficient to perform all the requir_ tasks, and thea'c will be a third case that I
call partial automation into which most of the systems will fall.
CASE _"
when
Humans and machines willshare informationand willjointlyexercisecontrol
a. thereare situationsinwhich the machine sensescertainfeanncs and
prrmessescertaindata while the human sensesand processesothersthatare
needed forthe decision;i.e.,informationabout the stateof the world must
bc sharedby thehuman and themachine to defum itstruestate;or
b. therearesituationsinwhich themachine initiatessome of thecontrolactions
while the human initiatescertainothercontrolactionsallof which must be
coordinated for proper performance; i.e., responsibilities for actions taken
to change the state of the world must be shared by the human and the
machine to achievethe mutuallydesiredstate.
Iam limitingmyself in thispresentationtothe situationsthatfallintothisthirdcategory of
partialautomation because,from a Human Fact¢_ pointof view, theserepresentthe
challengeof the future.Moreover, Iam assuring that,forthethe SEI missions, the
human willbc assignedthe responsibilitytomanage, operate,and assurethe safetyof the
system. Therefore,human-centered automation isthe key to system effectiveness.
Specifically,we need a philosophy of system designfor thecase when a human must rely
on computer-mediated data from sensorhardware for a _ of the information(noticeI
did not say data)thatisnecessaryand sufficientfor thehuman tomake thedecision,and
when thehuman must sham theresponsibilitiesforcontrolwith themachine.
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However, there is another intriguing subset of this third category which will occur when
we accept that the human may not always be the most competent decision maker, and when
the correct perception of the state of the world may only reside with the machine member of
the team. A system in which human users can override the machine parmer compromises
the goal of developing truly cooperative human-machine systems. A joint cognitive system
implies a productive relationship between the knowledge of the machine and that of the
human in which the different points of view are integrated in the decision process.
Someday, we may consider the case when the human is no longer the sole supplier of the
initiative, the direction, the integration, and the standards. We may accept that the safest
and most efficient system is one that incorporates considerable duplication or
interchangeability of functions among its human and non-human crew members and thus
benefits from the strengths of both. However, I do not foresee acceptance of this concept
within the life of the SEI program, and so I limit myself to developing the philosophy for
the human-centered design of partially automated subsystems that fall into the third
category described above.
The assumption that all critical decisions during the SEI missions will be left to the
judgment of the human member of the team, has considerable significance to the designs of
subsystems in the third category. Error-free operations by humans is impossible. Cicero
said "It is in the nature of man to err". However restrictive is the crew-selection process
and however much is invested in training and checking, there will still be residtufl human
errors. Consequently, even though the hunlan will be assigned responsibility for all the
critical decisions, we must accept the inevitability of human error and we must design the
system to minimize the consequences of these remaining errors. (Ref7, 15) Furthermore,
the system hardware must not make it difficult for the human to assume these
responsibilities. There is no point in relying on the real or imagined virtues of human
flexibility and innovation if the man-machine interface is so restrictive that the controller is
unable to be either flexible or innovative in the actions which the system allows him to
initiate. The objectives of a human-centered design should be to support humans to achieve
the operational objectives for which they are responsible. The human role must be treated
as central and the machine must be used to assist the human in achieving his goals rather
than to supplant him. Consequently, the fast question to be asked in a htmaan-centered
design philosophy is "In this situation, what is it that we expect the human to be able to
do?", followed by the question "What information and control must he have in order to do
id"
Even with the imposition of the human-centered constraint on the design, thinking of
humans and machines as working together as a total system is an appropriate orientation
toward system design for CASE 3. Dr. Jane Malin at the NASA Johnson Space Center has
called this "mala'ng intelligent systems team players". (Ref 26, 27, 28) My colleague at
Ames, Dr. Mary Connors, has used the term "crew system" to include all active, intelligent
flight participants, both human and automated; and the term "crew system dynamics" to
describe all activity of these members, both alone and in combination. (Ref 21) The
Committee on Human Factors of the National Research Council (Ref 16) has said that "A
system is any identiftable set of mutually influential entities associated for the purpose of
producing desired changes in the attribute state of objects." I propose that we view the
systems of CASE 3 in this context as being composed of teams of human and non-human
entities, in contrast to prevalent concepts of design that consider only the non-human
entities and exclude the human entities. (Ref 29) The mutual influences among the entities
constitute interactions, and system effectiveness is concerned with optimizing these
interactions, rather than the individual behaviors, except as there are behavioral limits on all
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entities. This approach recognizes that, just as in a team of human performers, proficiency
of the individual entities does not assure proficient and effective team or system
performance. (Ref 7,8)
Currently, the problem of the hun3an-computer interaction is often considered to be merely
one of interface design. In the case of the partially automated systems in CASE 3 that rely
on interactive cooperation, this viewlx_int is no longer appropriate. Interface design
corresponds to playing with the language when the problem that interferes with
communication of information and understanding is that humans come from a "culture" that
is totally dift'erent from .t_.t of the.non-human inteUigen.ce. Diffaences in the processes of
promem soJvmg aua aecmlon making are deeply rooted m the respective traditions and
cultures of humans and machines. Machines do not sense data, process it, solve problems,
make decisions, learn fi'om experience, or take actions the way humans do. Machine logic
is not the same as human logic. In fact, not evvtything that humans do is completely
logical It is easy to accept that a non-human intelligence cannot be expected to understand
a human. It is equally true, even if not so obvious, that a human cannot be expected to
understand a non-human intelligence. (Ref 30, 31) Without a doubt, improperly designed
interfaces will interfeae with understanding, but even the most elegantly designed interface
will not assure unde, standing under all circumstances. One cannot simply build an
automated system and then overlay it with interface features, and expect to achieve mutual
understanding between the human and the machine. (Ref 25)
A well-executed interface design is a necessary, but not a sufficient' condition for
coopetation. The objective of interface design is simply to put the data in the mode (i.e.,
visual, auditory, tactile, etc) and the format (Le., alphanumeric, iconic, clock dials,
thermometer tapes, color, font, size, location, etc) to maximize the likelihood that the
human can translate the data displayed into information. (It is not information until it is
perceived as such by the observer. The display designer cannot declare that his display is
information, because the act of informing does not guarantee a state of being informed.)
Interface design has little to do with ensuring that the information is necessary and
sufficient for the human to understand the state of the system. (Ref 9, 17) Unless
observers can effectively decode the representation to extract relevant inRmmtion (as
def'med individualistically by the observer), the representation wiU fail to support the user.
Most of the research on human-computer interface design is limited to studying the changes
in the "language" that may be necessary for understanding, rather than on the determination
of what is sufficient for undemanding. As Marshall has stated it, there is a common
perception that human factors specialists "....should be brought in to sprinkle magic dust
on the interface or workstation once it is largely developed". (Ref 32) The danger of
focusing on things like icon shapes and colors or pull-down menus rather than the more
fundamental issue of whether the appropriate information is being transferred is discussed
by Woods and Eastman. (Ref 33)
The process by which a human translates his psychological representations of the system
state, his goals, and his intentions into physical actions entails a good deal more than
extracting information from his sensor inputs. To perform a particular task, the human
selects and recognizespatternsrepresentingthesystem state,integratestheinputstoallof
hissensors,relatesthe integratedinputstohispreconceived reiaesenmfions,decides what
furtherinformationhe needs and acquiresit,inferswhat thisinformationimpfies,adds his
own previousknowledge about theactualand potentialstatesof the situationand hisown
value structure,biases,and emotions,predictswhat willhappen next'and considers
actionsto produce the desiredstateinordertoarriveatthe appropriatedecisions.To
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interpret the outcome of his actions, the human must be able to perceive the resulting
system state and relate those perceptions to his psychological representations. A problem
will ensue ff the non-human intelligence interferes with any part of this fundamental
process. (Ref 32, 33, 34)
Examples of these problems are to be found in our experiences with current advisory
systems. Many of the initial expert systems, that were called consultant or advisory
systems, possessed very little capability for supporting cooperative interaction with human
operators. (Ref25) People learning to use advisory devices bring with them prior
assumptions about the state of the world, and cause-effect and goal-action relations. They
use these assumptions in trying to understand the instructions, in devising a plan of what to
do, and then in trying to understand why the machine did not do what they had expected.
Interference with understanding and, hence, collaboration result when the human and the
advisory system do not have the same representations of the state of the world (or of each
other or of the system that both are monitoring). People have difficulty accepting advice
that appears to be inconsistent with their prior assumptions about the actual and potential
states of the situation. (Ref 35) Current advisory systems usually use question-and-
answer dialogs as the mechanism for achieving common understanding through
explanation. It has been demonstrated in a variety of applications of advisory systems that
these dialogs are not conducive to cooperative interaction because they must be structured
to fit the machine's model of the world which may not coincide with that of its human
parmer. The human has no possibility of conveying to the machine his own perceptions of
the state of the world which may be influenced by factors that have no meaning to the
machine. For instance, it seems inevitable that experts will sometimes disagree and, yet,
there has never been a provision for an expert user to register that he does not agree with
what the system is doing, and to compare reasons for his disagreement with the rationale of
the system. There is no possibility for the man and the machine to discover how much
each knows or what each knows nothing about. Furthermore, ff the human has an
incorrect image of the machine's model of the world, he may not be able to fit correctly any
conclusions of the machine into his image regardless of the degree of sophistication of
explanations.
The problem is that, in the current state of advisory-system design, the machine and the
human are not sharing information and perceptions about the state of the world in a manner
that will enable the LYgglll to arrive at a single consensus decision, and take an agreed upon
coordinated action. The solution to the problem of designing cooperative human-machine
systems is not in better interface designs or better explanations. The problem and its
solution reside elsewhere.
Cooperation is an information transfer problem which is inherendy an in_ractive process.
We will never achieve an interactive capability between human and non-human intelligence
as long as we continue to design the machine without consideration of the pere_tual and
cognitivelimitationsand capabilitiesof thehuman. The power of a human-machine system
residesinthe system designthatmakes themost effectiveuse of thecomplcazenmry
characteristicsof allof itscomponents. Therefore,we need a design philosophy based on
a concept thatforcesus tO thinkabout men and machines working togetherina parmership
toperform a task.In thisphilosophy,the allocationof tasksbetween men and machines
becomes a meaningless concept.
It is worth recalling some of the guidelines suggested by Wiener and Curry in their 1980
landmark paper titled "Flight Deck Automation: promises and problems" as they foresaw
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manyof the issues that I am trying to address in this new design philosophy. (Ref 36)
They pointed out, even then, that the question was "not whether a function can be
automated, but whether it should, due to the various human factor questions that are
raised". They questioned the assumption that automation can eliminate error, pointed out
failures in the interaction of humans with automation, and stated that "the rapid pace of
automation is outstripping one's ability to comprehend all the implications for crew
performance". Their gfftdeline statements noted, for example, that system performance of a
task must be easily interpretable by the operator, and in a way the user wants it done. Their
caution to designers to be aware of possible behavioral effects of automation is still valid a
decade later, and this paper expands on those same concerns in developing a new approach
to man-machine system design.
I propose that the coordinated activity when a team of individuals is required to perform a
complex task is the appropriate model on which to base a design philosophy for human-
machine collaboration. I suggest that we might structure such a philosophy on the bases of
the relevant empirical work on human-to-human interaction during cooperative problem
solving, and to relate the characteristics required of effective and valued human members of
the team to the design requirements of the non-human member. The results of NASA's
extensiveresearchingroup dynamics areparticularlyrelevantatthehigherlevelsof
human-machine integrationrequiredforthisdesignphilosophy.
My colleagues at Ames have been studying the characteristics of teamwork among the
members of the fright deck crew of commercial transports to develop models of effective
crew functioning and to understand the sources of performance breakdowns. They have
found that many performance failmes were caused, not by lack of technical ._)1._, but by
problems in coordination among crew members. They have concluded that the foundation
for achieving effective crew coordination resides within information wansfer processes.
Crew performance depends on thefundamental communication mechanisms by which
crewmembcrs coordinatetheiractivities, transmitand receiveinRmaaation,and solve
problems. Communication variations are not only task related, they are also crew relaw,&
(Ref 37, 38) Successful communication is a collaborative effort that includes such esoteric
behavioral qualities as coordination, compensatory behavior, mutual performance
monitoring, exchange of feedback, and adaptation to varying situational demands. The
proper exchange of information also depends on the skills that allow team members to
predict and anticipate the actions of other team members, and can be influenced by soeio-
psychological factors. It is not a simple problem to understand the mechanisms that are
important to successful communication among humans. It is significantly mtm_ difficult to
relate this understanding to the design features necessary and s_eatt to ensure successful
communication between humans and machines, and, yet, that is what I believe is needed in
the new philosophy of design.
Billings'firstguidelinetohuman-centered designforaircraftautomation statesthathuman-
centeredautomation should possessthefollowingattributesin "la'Opermeasure": (Red 15)
I. Accountable; i.e.,must inform thepilotof itsactionsand explainthem on
request.
2. Subordinate;i.e.,should never assume command, except inpre-defined
situationsin which itcan bc cotmtmmanded easily.
3. Predictable;Le.,operationsmust be,and appear tobe, predictabletothe pilot,
but, at the same time, must be
4. Adaptable; i.e., configurable within a wide range of pilot preferences.
5. Comprehensible; i.e., intelligible, and simple to understand, but,also
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6. Flexible; i.e., should enable a range of control and management options from
direct manual to autonomous.
7. Dependable; i.e., do what it is ordered to do, never do what it is not ordered
to do, and never make the situation worse, but, as perfection is impossible, it
must also be
8. Informative; i.e., keep the pilot well informed about what is going on.
9. Error resistant; i.e., keep the pilots from making errors, but, at the same time,
recognizing that this is not always possible, it must also be
10. Error tolerant; i.e., detect and mitigate the effects of pilot errors.
All of these "attributes" can be related to the characteristics that the Ames researchers have
found to be important to effective human-to-human communication.
In this design philosophy, both the machine and the human are viewed as information-
processing systems capable of independent, complex behavior. In order to ensure reliable
coordination, we will need to understand the processes of cognition of both entities and the
processes of information transfer needed to achieve compatibility. (Ref 5) For the human
members of the crew, the solution to the problem of ensuring effective coordination and
communication is a matter of proper selection, training, and organizational management;
for the non-human member, it becomes a matter of proper design.
VI. A POSSIBLE APPROACH
Simulation has become an important tool for investigating the behavior of complex systems
during conceptual and preliminary design. However, the analysis of system performance
through simulation requires efficient and effective representations of significant parameters
of interaction among its entities. The designer/analyst must have the ability to examine and
manipulate component models. Therefore, to make effective use of simulation during
preliminary design of the SEI human-machine systems, we need, in addition to the usual
models of the equipments and environments, a mod_l of the human activities, a model of
the tasks to be accomplished and of the role that the human is expected to play in
accomplishing those tasks, and a model of the human capabilities, limitations, and needs to
play that role. (Ref 5)
I am not suggesting that we will realize a true computational emulation of the hunaan brain
in the near furore. We arc only at the most elemental levels of undea'standing the
relationships between the human mind and behaviors and the biological structures and
electrochemical processes of the brain. We are far from implementing the
neurophysiological mechanisms in symbolic processors or conneetionist networks to
emulate the human cognitive and perceptual system.
For the present, however, we can settle for a good deal less. In order to be able to address
human factors issues during the conceptual design stages of missions and systems, we
need engineering human performance models.with which we can examine, at least, the
first-order effects of the complementary contributions of human and machine to a system.
Professor Gerlach already addressed this need in 1986 in his biomorphic model of the
physiological and psychological processes in a human in a single-display, single-axis
control situation. (Ref 39)
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Even though we cannot emulate the human brain, there is considerable promise for an
adequate model to simulate the way in which a human might or could act in a particular
situation. For instance, we have recently seen some great improvements in anthropometric
modeling that promise to meet adequately one of the requirements for model-based human
engin .eering. Today, we have.extremely elegant anthropometric models of easily created,
realisuc, and physically quantifiable human-figure motion via an interactive computer
graphics system. The designer is able to select human figures of different sizes that include
the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile male and female, based on NASA astronaut
demographics. These figures can be placed within a three-dimensional object environment
that can be created and stored. Joint limitations have been installed to eliminate
umeasonable movements, and kinematic and inverse kinematic controls are applied so that
goals and constraints may be used to position and orient the figure with extemalfmtemal
forces and torques applied to produce motion. Key poses can be stored and interpolated
for animation, allowing environmental limitations to be detected as a function of human size
and movement characteristics. Recent developments include a new 17-segment vertebral
column for very realistic torso movements, tncliminary collision detection/avoiclance
mechanisms, and new figure definitions based on detailed s_scannod imagus from
several somatotypes in each gender. In addition, by attaching the "view" of the
environment to the mannequin's eye, the program displays a persp_tive corresponding to
what the mannequin would "see" while moving in the environment, providing the fh"st step
toward further analysis and conclusions about object occlusion and visibility. We are
currently using this model in the Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System
(MIDAS) being developed at Ames in collaboration with the US Army. (Ref 40, 41) Our
colleagues at the NASA Johnson Space Center are accumulating the data to extend the
strength and motion characteristics of these models for use in micro-gravity simulations.
With models Like these we can begin to address some of the ergonomic issues of design.
More recently, we have begun developing computational methods for describing and
analyzing cognitive tasks comparable with the methods we have for analyzing physical
tasks. Considerable progress is being made in the new field of cognitive science where
mechanistic models of humans performing complex perceptual, cognitive, and motor tasks
are under development that may allow us to go beyond the descriptive approach of
traditional experimental psychology. Chm'ent research at NASA Ames on computational
modelling of human perception and cognition represent some encouraging attempts to
describe how humans accomplish various mental tasks.
The Cognition Simulation System (CSS) being developed by my colleagues at Ames is just
one representative study. (Ref 42) The CSS is a software system intended to aid
researchers in designing and evaluating models of human cognition by providing an
interactive, graphics-based simulation environment. CSS is a discrete-event simulation
system specialized for simulating distributed, partly parallel, partly serial processing
systems, like those typically hypothesized to underlie human infca-mation processing. CSS
can be used more generally to model any distributed system, and incorporates some of the
power of production systems. CSS has been used to date to model the role of human
attention in visual information processing, to model the delays imposed by doing two tasks
at once, and to model the flow of information during preparation for launch between the
NASA Test Director at the Kennedy Space Center and his various external inf.'marion
sources and equipment.
One important focus of interest at our Aerospace Human Factors Research Division is the
integration of these CSS models into the MIDAS architecture. The Symbolic Operator
Model(anelementof the MIDAS) models human IXar, cptual processes, cognitive
processcs, and responsedcffcctor processes using an integrated object-oriented architecna¢.
This model also provides a limited description of human neuromotor response and verbal
communication protocols. MIDAS includes the computational structures and utilities
requiredto supportthe modeling environment and knowledge-base through which these
componen_ interact,includingan.updateableworld representation,activity/procedural
rcpmsentanon, and rulesand decisionmethods which guide operatorbehavior in selection
among severalcontingentproceduralpaths and are responsiveto thecurrentmission
context.
Constructionof useful,integrated,mechanistic,cnginccringmodels of human IX:l'formance
now seems possible.However, thesestudieshave, so far,been limitedto modeling single
individuals.We are moving toward explicitattackson the problem of how individual
cognitioninteractswith perceptual,physiological,and group factors.We need now to
begin toconsidercommunications between such models and to factorintothesenew
models thoseelements thatwe have found importanttotransferof informationand
coordination.The agentarchitectureof thecomputationalmodels we have developed not
only enablesus tomodify any of thecomponents easily,but alsoisparticularlysuitedto
studyingan intermixofhuman and non-human agents.
Validationof our computationalmodels isessential,but extremely difficultA fundamental
problem of allHuman Factorsresearchisthatthetoolsand theoriesthathave been
developed in highly simplified and controlled laboratory environments arc of little
assistance in understanding human behavior in the complex and varied environment of
aerospace operations.
Another major difficulty in trying to build predictive models of human behavior is the fact
that behavior is often influenced by knowledge and emotions of which the actor is totally
unaware.. Perceptual.cognitive functions.such as discriminative response to stimulation,
pcrccpuon, memory, informauon processing,complex cognitiveactivity devoted to stimuli
thatare themselves outsideof awareness,and thehigher-xn'_rmental processesinvolved
injudgment orproblem-solvingcan alltakeplace outsideof phenomenal awareness and
can affect action. Realistically, we may never be able to find reliable, validated, predictive
models of systems in which human beings participate except in limited domains.
Nevertheless, with the contnued development and validation of these models, we expect to
use them insimulationstodevelop guidelinesfordesigns of missions,OlX:z'ations,and
procedures,as well as automated systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
One day, the intelligence of a computer may rival that of the human brain. One day, we
may learn how to couple human brains and computing machines in truly cooperative
partnerships. For now, however, we must continue to rely on human intelligence,
judgment, flexibility, creativity, and imagination in dealing with unexpected events, while
complementing these with machine capabilities for logic, speed, persistence, consistency,
and exactitude.
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In orderto achieve the objectives of human exploration of space envisioned in the SEI
program, we will need to learn how to integrate humans with machines to an extent far
beyond our current understandings. Our experience with automation in aviation convinces
us that current design philosophies based, largely, on allocation of functions and human
adaptability will not enable us to design the machines required to perform the SEI missions
with assurance of safe and reliable human interactions. We need to adopt a philosophy of
design that views the total system composed of human and non-human entities. We need
to be able to address human factors issues during the conceptual design stages of missions
and systems, and, for this, we will rely on simulations. Consequently, we need
computational human performance models.with which we can examine the effects of the
complementary contributions of the human and machine cotnponents to total system
performance.
We have only just begun to develop the models we need. Much research remains to
understand the perceptual and cognitive fimcfions, the infom_fional requirements, and the
mechanisms of communication adequately to model human interaction with non-human
intelligence. Research is needed that transcends the boundaries between the physical,
psychological, and social sciences. We need a full-spectrum, coordinated research
program calling for expertise in psychophysics, perception, cognition, physiology,
behavior, and group factors; utilizing a variety of approaches including analyses,
laboratory experiments, humau-perfcmmance modeling, partial-task and full-mission
simulators, testbeds, field and analog-environment studies, MIDAS-style integrated
human-engineering modeling and simulation, and space-flight tests..
I am going to conclude with a few recommendations for required research, but it is
important to remember that research focused on any of these problem areas should not
isolate itself from the system and the context within which it is embedded. Also, we cannot
investigate the way in which humans relate to non-human intelligence without adequately
representing the social environment within which the task is being carried out. The
following recommendations are not significantly different from those made by the
Committee on Human Factors of the National Research Council already in 1987. Ref 43
RECOMMENDATION 1: Design and support an aggressive program leading to the
understanding of human crew functioning and interactions, cooperative problem solving,
cooperative decision making, and productivity under stressful conditions, including
continual and intermittent exposures to multiple physiological and psychological stressors.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Design and suPlXrt an aggressive program leading to the
understanding of the nature of teamwork skills and how they develop, particularly in teams
composed of different cultural backgrounds. An understanding of "teamwork" is not only
important to developing the proper techniques for selection, training, and organization of
human crews, but is also essential to development of design guidelines for complex,
automated (and,possibly, learning) systems with which humans will need to _te.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Design and support an aggressive research program leading to
the eventual development of human-computer systems for cooperative control informadon,
and management. This is the most difficult of the technological goals related to cognitive
science associated with the SEI missions, and requires development of design principles
based on using model-based theories of cognition.
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Our currant situation cries out for cooperative research as them does not exist in any one
nationsufficientresourcesineitherexpertiseor money tosolvetheseproblems in a
reasonabletime. Ifccla sense of urgency,because while we arcstillstrugglingwith the
sciencetounderstand theproblems, theengineeringcommunity isspending a greatdealof
rnoncy designingthe solutions.
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